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Abstract
While the number and variety of models to explain opinion exchange dynamics is huge, attempts to justify the model
results using empirical data are relatively rare. As linking to real data is essential for establishing model credibility, this
Letter develops a empirical confirmation experiment by which an opinion model is related to real election data. The
model is based on a representation of opinions as a vector of k bits. Individuals interact according to the principle that
similarity leads to interaction and interaction leads to still more similarity. In the comparison to real data we concentrate
on the transient opinion profiles that form during the dynamic process. An artificial election procedure is introduced
which allows to relate transient opinion configurations to the electoral performance of candidates for which data is
available. The election procedure based on the well–established principle of proximity voting is repeatedly performed
during the transient period and remarkable statistical agreement with the empirical data is observed.
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1. Introduction
Using physical tools in the analysis of social collective
phenomena can help uncovering invisible structures, pat-
terns and mechanisms at work in real–world social sys-
tems. The work of Fortunato and Castellano in 2007 ([1])
is at the leading edge of this endeavour. Their analysis
of the electoral performance of candidates in various pro-
portional elections revealed an universal voting pattern,
which was shown to be independent of the characteristics
of the voting population, being instead, a consequence of
the elementary interactions.
Empirical data coming from electoral contexts provides
one of the most relevant accounts of preference distribu-
tions in existing societies. An opinion model with empir-
ical relevance should match these accounts of real–world
preference distributions.
In a recent paper ([2]), we analysed the interplay of
opinion dynamics and communication networks. Using a
bit–string model it was shown that non–trivial social struc-
tures emerge from simple rules for individual communica-
tion. Here, using the same abstract bit–string model, we
show that the universal scaling function found in Ref.[1] is
reproduced when artificial elections are run on the tran-
sient opinion profiles. Such an empirical confirmation fur-
ther increases our confidence on the model capabilities to
capture and to reproduce some fundamental aspects of
real–world dynamics of opinion exchanges.
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2. Opinion Models and Election Data
Attempts to compare model results to empirical data
are relatively rare in opinion dynamics ([3]). There are
however some studies with a reference to real data which
mostly use election results in the comparison (see [4], Sec.III.H
for an overview). This was initiated by a statistical analy-
sis of the 1998 Brazilian elections by Filho et al. ([5]) which
revealed that the distribution of votes among candidates
(P (v)) follows a hyperbolic law (i.e., P (v) ∝ 1
v
) in a range
of two orders of magnitude. Similar patterns were found
for the Indian elections ([6]). However, due to party com-
mitment or strategic voting behaviour a universal scaling
could not be expected ([1, 4]).
A different scenario characterizes the so–called Propor-
tional Elections, where each party competes with an open
list of candidates for multiple seats in the parliament. In
Ref. [1], the statistical analysis of proportional elections in
Italy (1958, 1972, 1987), Poland (2005) and Finland (2003)
revealed that "the distribution of the number of votes re-
ceived by the candidates is a universal scaling function,
identical in different countries and years" (p. 1). This
remarkable result is obtained by a re–scaling of the vote
numbers v by the number of candidates of the same party
Q and the total number of votes received by this party N .
The distribution of the function F (vQ
N
) is the same for all
the elections considered and a log–normal fit is shown to
approximate the data quite well.
Opinion studies referring to these new empirical in-
sights either concentrate on adaptations of the Sznjad model
([7, 6, 8]) or on very simple models of opinion spread in dif-
ferent network topologies ([9, 1]). Using a Sznjad model
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variant (see Refs. [10, 11]) where the opinion states di-
rectly account for the preference for one out of a set of
candidates, Bernardes et al. ([7]) show that a microscopic
opinion model reproduces the characteristic 1
v
–pattern of
the 1998 Brazilian elections. In this approach, there is first
a stage to construct an adequate initial condition, in which
different candidates have different initial chances of being
voted, and secondly a stage in which the usual Sznajd pro-
cess is performed in order to represent the electoral cam-
paign. The latter dynamical process is stopped at some
(arbitrary) iteration number and the respective transient
state is used in the comparison to real–world results.
Subsequent studies ([6, 8]) basically use the same mech-
anisms and analyse the effects of different network struc-
tures on the distribution of votes. The actual problem
with the approach due to Bernardes and colleagues ([7])
is the termination of the Sznajd process after a "certain
carefully chosen time" ([4], p. 612). No reasonable argu-
ment is presented for the choice of this iteration number.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear how much of the sim-
ilarity is due to the quite complicated construction of the
initial condition.
An alternative opinion model capable of reproducing
the voting pattern of the Brazilian and the Indian elections
was proposed by Travieso and Costa in 2006 ([9]). Voters
are treated as the nodes of a network. Initially, some of
these nodes are assigned to a favourite candidate and all
the others are treated as undecided. Then, decided nodes
are chosen randomly and all their undecided neighbours
are associated to the respective candidate. Already de-
cided nodes change the candidate preference with a given
switching probability. In some sense, this model is simi-
lar to the set–up stage of the initial conditions in Ref. [7].
This simple model is run on Erdõs–Rényi and Barabási
networks and it succeeds in reproducing the pattern in the
first but not in the latter case. In Ref. [1], a similar model
of opinion spread on treelike graphs is used to explain the
universal pattern found for proportional elections.
In what follows, an alternative microscopic explanation
is provided. Briefly, the essential lines used in previous
attempts to empirically confirm opinion models are the
following: (i) the models attempt to reproduce universal
patterns, which are normally expressed in terms of scaling
laws; (ii) in explaining these universal patterns, the system
underlying topology is frequently called into place and (iii)
the dynamical process comprise three different periods in
time: (1) setting up initial conditions, (2) the process final
(steady) state and (3) an intermediate time interval lying
in between the (1) and (2).
3. Method
3.1. The Model
In our recently introduced model of opinion exchange
(Ref. [2]), opinions are represented as a series of k bits, ac-
counting for the positions concerning k different issues in
the agents mind. This is similar to the well–known model
of cultural dissemination introduced by Axelrod ([12, 13]).
In the beginning of the simulation N agents are generated
and a random bit–string is assigned to them. In the itera-
tion process, two agents meet at random. The two players
(i, j) are willing to communicate about an issue (one el-
ement of the bit–string), only if the number of unequal
bits is below or equal to a similarity threshold dI (i.e.,
d(xi, xj) ≤ dI). The result of successful communication is
that the agent chosen first (xi) adopts the opinion of the
other (xj) by flipping one of the unequal bits. The con-
ceptual idea behind this is that provided that the views of
two individuals are close enough, similarity leads to inter-
action and interaction leads to still more similarity. These
dynamic rules are summarized in the following steps:
1. An initial random set–up of N bit–strings of length
k according to the uniform distribution;
2. a dynamic process which iterates:
(a) random choice of two agent strings xi, xj ,
(b) compute the Hamming distance d(xi, xj) and
if d(xi, xj) ≤ dI flip one of the unequal bits
chosen at random for xi (opinion exchange);
3. the termination of this process as soon no more ex-
change is possible.
By applying the rules repeatedly, the process converges
to a stable opinion profile in which every two agents either
agree in all the issues or their disagreement is larger than
dI . Depending on dI , different behaviour of the popu-
lation is observed: low values result in a state of highly
fragmented opinions and higher values yield consensus. A
precise study of the opinion distribution in the frozen state
is presented in Ref. [2]. In the present work, we concentrate
on the opinion profiles before freezing in a stable configu-
ration. Model parameters are chosen in order to eventually
lead to a global (quasi–)consensus profile, while requiring
a relatively long time to reach the absorbing state (i.e.,
k = 20, dI = 5 and 200 ≤ N ≤ 4000).
3.2. Artificial Elections and the Transient
The dynamical evolution of the preferences is charac-
terised by three different eras. In the first period, called
the burn–in phase (this terminology follows the work of
Laver and Sergenti, [14]), preference patterns which do
not deviate significantly from the random initial case are
observed. The period after the simulation "burnt–in", we
refer to as transient phase. The opinion structure is some-
where in between randomness and order, and the main
hypothesis made in this Letter is that preference distri-
butions comparing to real–world preference profiles have
emerged. The third and final dynamic era is characterized
by a relatively fast convergence to a stable profile with all
the agents in the same state. Fig. 1 shows the dynamical
evolution of the relative support provided for five issues.
The question for the empirical confirmation experiment
is whether the preference distribution observed in the tran-
sient of the model is realistic. In order to relate opin-
ion profiles to the electoral performance of candidates (for
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Figure 1: The dynamical phases of a model run. The curves represent
the level of support regarding five issues in the binary opinion string
of length k = 20.
which the data is available [15]) an artificial election pro-
cedure is introduced. The election procedure is based on
the well–established principle of proximity voting which
assumes that a voter chooses the candidate which is clos-
est to her/him. Proximity voting was first proposed back
in 1929 by Hotelling ([16]) in the context of economic com-
petition and later (in 1957) applied to the problem of can-
didate positioning by Downs ([17]).
Initially, Q random bit–strings are generated and taken
to account for the policy propositions of Q different candi-
dates. Then, a proximity voting election procedure is per-
formed. The implementation of such procedure is based on
the work of Araújo et al. in two different contexts: the one
where consumers are driven by market–oriented innova-
tions ([18]) and another where workers compete for jobs in
a labour market ([19]). In the procedure, the "best" candi-
date string is determined for each agent. For this purpose,
the Hamming distances to all the Q candidate strings are
computed and compared to each other. An agent chooses
that candidate string with which (s)he has the most bits in
common (largest matching). If the largest matching value
of an agent is obtained with two or more candidates, we
throw a fair coin (dice). In this way the number of votes
received by the Q candidates is determined.
4. Results
4.1. Distribution of Votes
Fig. 2 shows a typical time–evolution of a repeated
election process for five different candidates (Q = 5). If
five candidates apply for the votes in a population with
random preferences every one of them gets approximately
20% of the votes. In the burn–in phase, all the candidate
support levels are near this theoretical result for random
opinion states. Only after the simulation evolved in time,
do candidates perform significantly better than that (and
therefore others do worse). As the simulation continues,
the population converges to a consensus configuration and
all the voters eventually vote for the same candidate. All
the votes are received by the candidate which is closest to
the consensus opinion string.
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Figure 2: The dynamical phases of a model run. The curves repre-
sent a repeated voting process in which agents can choose from five
different candidates with random policy positions.
We observe in Fig. 2 that for quite a long period (from
60 to 80%) the five–candidate example yields a pattern
with two major parties and three minor ones. We cur-
rently have a similar situation in Germany. Though this
is a first indication of realistic voting patterns, only a sta-
tistical comparison based on a larger number of elections
can confirm that realistic voting behaviour is observed in
the election scenario. Therefore, a systematic computa-
tional experiment has been performed, in which a series
of artificial elections is run on (a series of) evolving agent
populations. During the opinion simulation, elections are
performed repeatedly after a certain number of iterations
has passed. To avoid that particular candidate positions
of a certain random set–up correlate (in the sense that
some strings are closer together than others) and that such
positional correlations affect the statistics of the electoral
performance, new random candidate strings are assigned
before each election.1
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Figure 3: Voting behaviour of a population ofN = 4000 agents which
choose Q = 10 candidates during different time periods.
1Note that we did not do so in Fig. 3 and therefore a continuous
electoral performance evolution is observed.
3
Fig. 3 shows how the vote distribution behaves during
different periods of the model for a population ofN = 4000
agents which choose Q = 10 candidates. During the burn–
in phase in the beginning of the simulation the vote dis-
tribution is similar to the normal distribution (with µ =
Q
N
= 400, σ = 100). In the last period many candidates
have zero votes for the benefit of a single candidate which
gains the support of almost all the voters. Both cases rep-
resent unrealistic situations. More realistic voting patterns
are observed in a period of 70 to 95% of the simulation
time. There are only very few cases of zero votes (which
is more realistic as in real elections at least the candidate
votes for himself). And also candidates that arrive to be
supported by 20 up to 50% of the population are observed
with reasonable frequency. Note that only one specific
electoral set–up is considered here in which 10 candidates
compete for the votes of 4000 people. This is not suited for
a comparison to real proportional elections which consist
of a series of heterogeneous electoral settings, but it serves
as an identification of that period in the transient which
should be considered in the statistical comparison.
4.2. Statistical Comparison to Real Elections
For this comparison a series of election experiments as
described above has been performed with differing candi-
date numbers (from 5 to 30) and number of voters (from
200 to 4000). To be able to compare these different vot-
ing environments, a re–scaling as proposed by Fortunato
and Castellano in [1] is applied. In this normalisation, the
number of votes (v) is multiplied by the number of candi-
dates (Q) and divided by the number of voters (N) and
the distribution of the function F (vQ
N
) is considered. This
re–scaling is applied to the results of the repeated artificial
elections on the one hand and to the results of the 2003
Finish elections on the other. The Finland 2003 election
data is available under [15] (170 voting sets on the whole).
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Figure 4: Comparison of the 2003 Finland elections to the results of
a series of artificial elections performed on transient opinion profiles.
The result which is shown in Fig. 4 is unambiguous.
The voting behaviour in the proportional elections in Fin-
land is reproduced by elections performed on the tran-
sient opinion profiles as they form during the iteration of
the opinion exchange model. As the Finland data shares
this distributional properties with other proportional elec-
tions ([1]), this provides a strong indication that impor-
tant aspects of real preference dynamics are captured by
the model opinion exchange introduced in Ref. [2].
5. Conclusions
We presented an empirical confirmation experiment which
allows to relate vector opinion models to election data.
This is achieved by an artificial election procedure based
on the well–established principle of proximity voting which
is run on transient opinion profiles. The statistical compar-
ison shows that preference distributions can be observed
in the run of the opinion model that relate to preference
distributions in real societies. The voting behaviour in
proportional elections is reproduced. The statistical agree-
ment with the Finland 2003 elections is remarkable.
For these reasons, the model provides an alternative
microscopic explanation for the universal voting pattern
found in [1]. While their spreading model is very simple,
the model used here has shown suitable also for the gen-
eration of realistic communication networks ([2]) so that a
link to reality is provided in different domains. We envision
that future opinion studies will be more rigorously tested
against empirical data and hope that the confirmation ex-
periment introduced here will assist this development.
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